The Politics of Central American Integration by Rafael A. Sánchez Sánchez

Author:Rafael A. Sánchez Sánchez [Sánchez, Rafael A. Sánchez]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, General, Political Science, World, Treaties
ISBN: 9781135843441
Google: H16RAgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 17526203
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2008-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

For the Sandinistas, the modified Arias plan meant two things: survival in the face of an economy destroyed by the war and legal recognition by the presidents, something that, as Soto Acosta asserts (1991, 16) ‘the 1984 presidential elections did not secure’. Arias did not question the legality of the Sandinista government, but its democratic legitimacy (Rojas Aravena 1990b). With the Contras militarily defeated, the peace plan could only mean their final political collapse, which would allow the government to concentrate on rebuilding the economy, to reintegrate the country into the CACM, and to pursue its talks with the unarmed opposition. This is why the Reagan administration rejected the revised version of the Arias plan, despite its support for the original initiative, viewing it as harmful to Contadora and the Sandinistas (Schulz and Sundloff Schulz 1994).

The main Nicaraguan bargain consisted, first of all of a compromise among the governments regarding the non- use of their national territories to support irregular forces (Contras) against another state (Nicaragua) and a call to foreign powers (the US) to cease aiding irregular forces fighting the governments. Second, a compromise regarding peace and democratisation in the region. According to D’Escoto (1997), the Arias plan was designed to be applied exclusively to Nicaragua. In line with Reagan’s policy, the other governments were reluctant to assume responsibility for peace and democratisation. They did not recognise having a problem of democratic legitimacy despite the civil war in El Salvador and Guatemala and the military over-shadowing of the democratic government in Honduras. For them their legality was based on their democratic legitimacy, something they did not extend to Nicaragua, but which provided some ground for bargaining.

It was Nicaragua that insisted that the issue of democratisation had to be extended to the other states as well, not just to Nicaragua. Under the Arias plan the Sandinistas committed themselves to allow free elections, to talk directly to the armed opposition, something they had refused to do before, to guarantee free speech and political pluralism. Nicaragua became the most responsible state in implementing the peace plan. ‘The government indicated that it would meet its obligations even if the other signatories did not’ (Schulz and Sundloff Schulz 1994, 182). When on January 14, 1988, the International Commission for Verification and Follow up (CIVS) created by the Arias plan presented its report to the presidents during a summit in Alajuela (Costa Rica), only Nicaragua was found to be in full compliance of the Esquipulas agreement. The other states, except Costa Rica, had put numerous obstacles up to it (LASA Report 1988; Moreno 1994). In the Presidential summit at Costa del Sol in El Salvador on February 14–15, 1988, Ortega proposed the holding of an election even earlier than stipulated in the Constitution. This was considered to be a strategic move aimed at capitalising on his high popularity. The Sandinistas thought that because of their popularity an earlier call of the elections would ensure their victory. But this was a miscalculation. Instead, it dragged the

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